Robert Jackson

Robert Houghwout Jackson (February 13rd 1892, October 9th 1954) was the prosecutor as a chief for the the United States with the Procès of Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946. One needs also public prosecutor of the United States ( Attorney General , Minister for Justice) of 1940 for 1941, then judge with the Supreme court of the United States until its death.

Youth

Jackson was born in Spring Creek Township, the North-West of the Pennsylvania and grows in Frewsburg, which is very close but in the State to New York. He studies with the college of Frewsburg, then in the city close to Jamestown. At 18 years, it begins a training in a law firm in Jamestown, it studies two years with Law School (school of training of lawyers) of Albany, then returns at the summer 1912 in Jamestown for another year of training. It is received with the examination of the bar of New York and opens its own cabinet, always in Jamestown. It carries out during nearly twenty years a brilliant lawyer career in the State of New York. It is even one of stars rising of the bar on a country scale.

The federal government, 1934-1940

Jackson is named in the federal administration by the president Franklin Roosevelt in 1934. It is initially responsible legal ( general counsel ) with the direction for the taxes ( Bureau off Internal Revenue , today Internal Revenue Service ) which belongs to the department of the treasure. In 1936, it deviate assistant public prosecutor ( Assistant Attorney General , a station of row raised with the ministry for justice) in load of the tax questions, then in 1937 of antitrust division. In 1938 it is named Solicitor General of the United States: it is charged to organize the legal representation with the government of the United States and to plead for him owe the Supreme court. It becomes finally Attorney General in 1940 when its predecessor James Murphy is named at the Supreme court.

First years at the Supreme court

In 1941, the president of the Court, Charles Evans Hughes share with the retirement and Roosevelt decides to promote the judge Harlan Fiske Stone with the head of the Court. It names at the same time Jackson with the vacant seat left by Stone. He one of the large judges of the history of the Court, one of his large feathers, is noticed for the strength of his style.

In 1943, it is him which writes the opinion of the Court for a major stop, West Virginia State Board off Education v. Barnette (Commission of the education of the State of Western Virginia against Barnette, or simply Barnette stop). The stop, into a reversal of jurisprudence, rejects the obligation made to the children of the schools greet the flag and recite the Serment of allegiance, being based on the freedom of expression guaranteed to the first amendment with the constitution. Jackson, abundantly quoted thereafter, written: Those which want to eliminate the expression from dissenting opinion end soon up eliminating the dissidents themselves. To standardize the opinions by the constraint, one obtains only the unanimity of the cemeteries ; and further: the object even of the Declaration of the rights (Bill off Rights) is to put certain subjects at the shelter of the vicissitudes of the political controversies, and out of reach of the majorities: the right of each one to the life, freedom, with the property, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and other basic rights cannot depend on an election .

The following year, at the time of an other historical stop, Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu against the United States) and this time against the majority of the Court, it disputes the legality of the internment of American of Japanese origin residing on the west coast during the war. Korematsu was condemned for an act which usually is not not a crime. That consists in being in the State of which he is citizen, close to the place where he was born and lived all his life . Contrary to his/her Murphy colleague, for whom the decision of distance of the people of Japanese origin belongs to the dreadful abyssal zone of racism , Jackson does not want to come to a conclusion about the military need for the evacuation. But contrary to the majority of the Court, he refuses idea that the Court, inapt to consider need military, can only approve: the judgment of Korematsu rests on an order of the general De Witt. And one tells us (the decision of the Court) that if this order is reasonably founded on military needs, then it is constitutional and becomes the law, and this Court must make it apply. For several reasons, I cannot subscribe to these doctrines . As much one cannot require army in time of war a permanent respect of legality ( the first consideration is that measurements taken are effective, not that it is legal. The role of the army is to protect the company, not only the constitution ), as much the Court must take care not to bring the guarantee of the law there: a military measurement, if unconstitutional that it can be, only lasts what the urgency lasts But when the Court the interpreter to show that it is in conformity with the constitution, or rather interprets the constitution to make him approve such a measure, the Court validated for the future the principle of racial discrimination in a penal procedure and that of displacement forced American citizens. The worked out principle becomes a weapon charged which will be for always at the disposal of any authority which could establish the plausibility of an urgent need. A military commander can exceed the terminals of the constitution and it is an incident. But if we approve it, this momentary incident becomes the doctrines of the Constitution .

The lawsuit of Nuremberg

Return to the Supreme court

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