Battle of the lake Trasimène

The battles of the Lac Trasimène of 217 av. J. - C. is a battle-key of the Second Punic War and opposes the Roman troops of the consul Flaminius to the Carthaginian army ordered by Hannibal Barca, which takes its adversaries in a ambush and a severe defeat inflicts to them.

Whereas Hannibal Barca has just invaded the inflicting Italy demolished on defeat with the Roman army, the latter decides to engage a battle that she hopes decisive. The Roman army thus launches out to the continuation of Hannibal: initially, the Roman camp settles for the night in the small valley (??) Lake Trasimène. In the morning, in the fog, the Roman army recovers in formation from walk: carriages of vivres in the medium, soldiers moving on the sides, and graded at the head walk. But Hannibal and its troops discussed the sides of the hills, in height, and launch out to the attack of the Roman convoy. The Roman Consul and graded dies the first. So the commun run of the soldiers, completely disorganized, does not see from which the attack comes and the Roman infantrymen are cut in parts, number of them trying to flee without organization. Some are killed, others try to flee by the lake and run because of their armament, or remain enlized there, while some manage to flee. Hannibal decides to continue the runaways, that it makes captive quickly, making connect the Romans and slackening the allies of Rome in order to encourage them to break their alliance: indeed, Hannibal does not make the war in the Latin world, but only in Rome. Other isolated runaways join Rome with foot and tell crushing it demolished. The military elite of Rome is decimated.

However, Hannibal chooses not to leave to the attack this “shot down Rome” because, in spite of the regrets and criticisms, it knows that it does not have weapons of seat and that the attack of Rome will imply a very long seat. It would have itself quickly to face the problems of provisioning. During this time, allied armies of Rome would have in their turn have the free field to organize and attack it. The mobile warfare thus continued.

Sources

The `' Stories'' of Polybe are a literary work written in Greek, partially preserved of which the original goal (announced by Polybe as of the introduction) is of knowing how and thanks to which government the Roman State could extend a so broad domination in less than fifty three years (of 220 beginning of the Second Punic War with 168 end of the third war of Macedonia). Book III draft more particularly of three fields: of Polybe itself, punic Carthage with its history and its civilization and in the last of the Punic Wars and in particular of that which was often called by the historians of Greek language the “Guerre of Hannibal”. The battle of the Lake Trasimène in spring 217, opponent Romans and Carthaginian, is at the same time a manifestation of the skilful genius of Hannibal putting at good its project of invasion of Italy, but also a symbol of the will of the Romans to fight despite everything against the invader.

Portraits of the two generals

Caius Flaminius

Flaminius, in 232, is Tribun of the plebs and benefits from it to make pass an agrarian law in favor of the division of the grounds conquered on Senones in Picenum. Two years later it becomes Préteur, where it had the load of the Sicily which it managed with a great integrity. In 223 he becomes consul and having overcome Gallic north of Italy, he obtains the triumph. In 220, it becomes Censeur then for the second time it takes again the function of Consul into 217 and shares the capacity with Cneius Servilius Geminus.

At the beginning of its second consulate it takes its districts with Arezzo (Arretium) to protect the Étrurie, it orders two legions and of the allied troops there. With the approach of the Lake Trasimène, it knows that the Carthaginians precede it and that they have as a Rome destination. It makes hasty decisions, persuaded to profit from knowledge of the ground. He considers inevitable the confrontation with his enemies since, their race necessarily should be slowed down. But on this point, he is opposed to his officers who prefer to wait until Cneius Servilius Geminus joins them and that the two armies are linked for the battle. The choices and the precipitation of Flaminius will be among the causes of the disaster.

Falminius had already the reputation to be impetuous, infatué of him even and more daring than intelligent. Polybe speaks about a “unexpected appearance”, and others of authors (whose Tite-Live) could propose the impatience of Flaminius at going to fight forgetting to subject itself to elementary rules such as sending scouts to examine the neighborhoods. Also, its humiliation and the attack carried to its prestige of chief probably caused him a great despair, the more so as it could nothing make to rectify the situation, completely impotent which it was in front of the disaster for which it took the responsibility. During the combat which made rage during nearly three hours, it showed all the same much courage although there could not be of exit favorable to the Romans. It was killed by a rider of the name of Ducarius, which had the will to avenge the defeat that Flaminius had inflicted with its people into 223 on banks of the Clusius.

Hannibal

Hannibal has a very effective network of information (the Romans will discover in their city of the spies which hid there since years). It takes note carefully of topography to the accesses it lake in order to benefit from it. One also knows that it the USA of an astonishing trick to consolidate Flaminius in his assumptions which the Carthaginian troops were much further than actually. For this purpose, it made light the day before the battle of fires on the close hills. The exit of the battle was related to a great number of factors (time, Flaminius, its allies); if only one of them had defect, Hannibal would have been found taken with its own trap. Far from impulsiveness, its great intentions are prepared lengthily by solitary meditations and all is weighed with prudence. Many contemporaries admired in him the genius tactician, but also the born leader. Indeed, it had succeeded in rejoining people of which it had crossed the regions such Gallic Cisalpins, while proposing to withdraw them from the yoke Romans, which one could describe as strategy of substitution . Many contemporaries (Greek and Roman) taxed it with cruelty, however that does not seem not justified even if it undoubtedly had by its plan “sacrificed” its Gallic soldiers to preserve his Carthaginian guard.

The ambush: tactic and unfolding

Strategy of the ambush

Like shows it the chart, the plain bordering the lake forms a true trap. The narrow procession on the flat ground forms a Vallon between Borghetto and Passigano. It is enclosed enters, in the south, the lake, and in north, of the naturally strengthened and difficult to reach hills.

Hannibal saw in this place an ideal trap: once the Romans entered the procession, they were taken with the trap. The Carthaginians quietly spent the night on their positions: Hannibal and its infantrymen Libyan and Spanish camped on the steep slope (?). Its light infantry safeguarded derrières the slopes, and the cavalry numide as well as the Gallic ones hid close to the place where the road in the valley emerged and took seat in the small hour. Almost unforeseeable, the darkness and the fog played a considerable part in this company. When Flaminius decides crossing of the procession in the small hour, there was much fog, which returned the displacement of the difficult Romans. However what handicaps the Romans does not obstruct the Carthaginians at all since they are posted in height on the hills where the fog does not prevail. In addition, this position gives to the Carthaginoises units a broader vision, and allows them to coordinate each other by creating a movement organized against the Roman troops.

Unfolding of the combat

When Flaminius engages its troops in the narrow corridor along bank, it really does not suspect that it is observed by Hannibal and the Carthaginians, which wait the good moment to close again the trap. The Carthaginians are organized according to a quite precise plan, in four bodies, west towards the east, initially the riders, then the Gaulois, then the Balearic Islands and Carthaginois, finally Ibères and the Africans. Thus all the sides of the place were covered with “miles places at the same time”. And when finally the troops of Flaminius understood that they were taken in a ambush it was already too late for them; they could not be spread and be put in battle order. The avant-garde made up of 6000 men approximately was quickly separated from large from the troop. The men of this one, including/understanding what occurred, moved away precipitately from the battle field and “withdrew themselves on a village D `Étrurie”.

So Hannibal, which had had the will to separate the Romans by small groups, could weaken them for better neutralizing them. They resisted only little of time especially by the fact of the surprise. This “death with the improvist” created a general panic, and as well the “situation was confused” as forgetting the principles which governed their army (“not to flee, not to give up its station”) the Romans launched out in a general stampede, “losing any coolness and any reason”. Those which were not made massacre in the first moments of the confrontation, carried their hopes on the escape, whose however options were very limited: some preferred to be thrown in the lake, others went supposing to thus see their saved lives, others finally chose to penetrate in the small valley and to cross the enemy lines.

It was not any more question then of Roman army as well the disorder reigned, each one not thinking as of its own life, not even with that of his comrades (“could not carry help to their”) and not more in Rome which had to be protected. The violence of the combat, which lasted nearly three hours, was such as the Romans “was cut in parts”, “without being able to defend oneself”, “drowned”

Polybe and other authors speak about a terrible earthquake which would have prevailed at the same time and which would have destroyed many Italian cities but that the soldiers would not have felt, so much the violence of the confrontations which they underwent was heavy.

Consequences of the disaster

Results

After three hours of violences the losses are very heavy Roman side: the consul (the distinct head) and 15000 soldiers perished massacred with the wire of the sword or drowned in the lake and 15000 prisoners of which soldiers of the avant-garde. 6000 soldiers with the column heading succeed in boring and escaping from the trap, but caught up with by the riders of Maharbal in the night, they are captured. The Italian prisoners were returned without the least ransom demand it is the continuation of the started policy with recalling Trébie than it brought “freedom to them”, it is there all the political skill of Hannibal. The way in which Hannibal treats its prisoners remains very discussed. The conditions of their rendering are dubious. According to Polybe, “they deposited the weapons and went to condition of having the safe life”, however Tite Live (known as that the Romans are released) does not give the same version. Polybe approaches more reality since the historians also affirm them that Maharbal had taken the initiative to grant the life to them saves if they went.

But Hannibal in opposition with this decision declared to them that Maharbal at all did not have the right to promise that and the Roman prisoners were less lucky since they were captured in major part. On another sides, the Carthaginoises losses are definitely less, roughly between 1500 and 2500 men, in majority of Gallic to which one makes give a burial all the same. Selonr the authors, the Gallic ones were disciplined Carthaginian army, which made easy targets of them. However, another point of view was advanced: indeed it was known as that actually Hannibal attached less importance to this fraction of its army which does not seem absolutely essential to him to the success of its project (in comparison in the Spaniards, Africans or Ibères).

Consequences

This conflict is not concluded after the three hours from conflict, in opposition with item 15 of Polybe which affirms that the combat finishes. Since little time after, the army of Servilius arrives at forced march, by the Voie Flaminienne, with the help certainly late of his/her colleague. But Maharbal and the punic cavalry envoys by Hannibal, which had envisaged this possibility, leaves to its meeting and destroys before Roman guard of 4000 riders ordered by Gaius Centenius, in the battle of the Marais of Plestia, which turned again to the disaster for Rome. This situation presented for Rome of many dangers since Hannibal had just drawn aside at the same time Flaminius, but also the avant-garde of Servilius (which him was well behind) and thus the passage towards Rome were open.

The terrible news is spread like a powder trail arriving to the doors of Rome, where it was necessary to announce the inconceivable one: “We were overcome, announced the praetor Mr. Pomponius, in a great battle”. The reaction was at least of stupor, according to Polybe and worse according to Silius Italicus “the fear broke out and panic worsened the storm”. No detail was given to the Roman people as for the severity of the undergone defeat with Trasimène, but from the semi-official information learned that the consul had perished and that the army was mainly exterminated and that those which despite everything had succeeded in escaping the massacre were prisoners of Hannibal or wandered in Étrurie. The surprise and the doubt seized the population.

Conclusion

The battle of the lake Trasimène is original, because it does not fit in the traditional kind of the battles of Antiquity, since it is a ambush.

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