Battle of Palo Hincado
The battles of Palo Hincado , the November 7th 1808, was the third great military confrontation showing the secular Dominican will to continue to speak Spanish. The precedents had been the victory over the English in 1655 and the Bataille of Sabana Real the January 21st 1691.
Beginnings of the Reconquista in the east
In 1808, in the south-west of the country operated already, with the support of Haitian, the leaders Ciriaco Ramirez and Cristóbal Uber Franco, themselves supported by the governor of Puerto Rico, the general Toribio Montes. The September 17th of this same year, Juan Sánchez Ramírez benefitted from the occasion of a Spanish ship with Samaná to write and to ask of the assistance the Montes governor. The 28 of the same month arrived, of Puerto Rico, the Spanish Goélette Monserrate with the news of the imminent arrival of the support requested by Sánchez.Whereas Ferrand, the French governor, with the current of the events, prepared with subduing the imminent rebellion, Sánchez Ramirez gained with one, for the cause of the Reconquista , the creole authorities which were with the service of the France in the Eastern area. Then, it was easy for him to take the Villa del Seibo the October 26th.
The October 29th, at the mouth of the Río Yuma ( Boca de Yuma ), arrived the support sent by the Montes governor from Puerto Rico, Sánchez Ramirez left itself to accommodate it with horse. The material which had been embarked in a Brigantine, a goélette and two high-speed motorboat S equipped with guns, consisted of four hundred rifles with bayonets and two hundred sabers. Moreover, there were also two hundred volunteers, for the majority emigrated. The brigantine and the goélette, that one called respectively Federico and Render , were to then go back to Puerto Rico, charged with Acajou.
It is at this time that Ferrand left for the Seibo with a sizeable army, decided to subdue the revolt. The moment was serious for the revolutionists. It was urgent to make Samaná a bastion of the Reconquista , because without the possession of place-strong harbor, the vivres and reinforcements would have evil to be conveyed with revolted. Sánchez Ramirez benefitted then from the presence of warships of the Royal Navy (England) off the coasts and required of the commander Dashwood, of the frigate the Frankness , to attack the French garrison of Samaná. In exchange, Sánchez Ramirez ensured that it could count on the co-operation of the commander of Sabana of Mar , Diego to him de Lira, already allied with the Hispanic cause.
The Revolution is organized
Unloaded volunteers with Yuma, the only true soldier who remained out of Dominican ground to make the countryside was the lieutenant of militia Francisco Díaz which was incorporated in the quota of Sánchez Ramirez in the capacity as voluntary compatriot. Being one of only which was informed of the military tactics, Sánchez Ramirez entrusted to him the command of logistics until Seibo. It then charged it with organizing the military preparation and the choice of the most advantageous position to await the enemy who approached. After a study of all the zone, Díaz chooses the surroundings of Magarín .With Higüey, the November 3rd at dawn, the Dominican Caudillo, with the head of its men, organized companies and distributed weapons and ammunition. Very early, the troops met in the sanctuary of Nuestra Señora of Altagracia and listened to the mass. At the end of the ceremony one accepted the news which French was very close to Seibo. Sánchez Ramirez gave the order then to undertake walk towards the West, with the meeting of the enemy. The November 5th, Sánchez Ramirez continued to organize its army improvised by incorporating the volunteers who continued to arrive. The installation and the distribution of the weapons and the ammunition were with load of lieutenant Díaz.
In the night an intimation of the French general Ferrand arrived, in whom he announced that it would arrive at Seibo the 7. The intimation of Ferrand, Sánchez Ramirez answered that it was laid out to measure its forces with French. The Napoleonean general took that like a fanfaronnade and could not prevent oneself from smiling. From its armament and the tactical superiority of its men, it was seen surely already as a winner vis-a-vis the Creoles, little prepared and badly armed. It did not make case of the warnings which indicated that one did not have to neglect the value of the soldiers of Sánchez Ramirez, especially not their handling of the knife and their taste for the engagements.
Revolutionary countryside of the Seibo
The November 6th, Sánchez Ramirez arrived at Magarín and it appeared to him that the site had not been well chosen by lieutenant Francisco Díaz. It decided whereas Palo Hincado, in the west of Seibo, met better conditions. But, the rain did not cease, with all its unfavourable consequences. At the dawn of the November 7th, around Candelaria, the troops of Sánchez Ramirez had to establish a camping in order to dry the guns, the ammunition and the troops, and to provide lances to the riders. Arrived at Palo Hincado, between nine and ten hours of the morning, it settled with its complete staff, exempting his orders to place its troops suitably.Between much of other provisions, it took that to order Porto Rican to Jose Rosa to hide with thirty fusiliers to distract the attention from the enemy when fire with the front one would cease. Rosa belonged to the troops arrived at Yuma on October 29th. Located at the center of its army, it placed on its right-hand side Manuel Carvajal and on its left Pedro Vásquez. Miguel Febles would be used to him as adjudant major. Sánchez Ramirez recommended to attack with the Knife after the first salvo, to prevent that the tactics and the best armament of French do not take the top. It finished the harangue by announcing that it would apply the capital punishment to the soldier who would turn the face behind; with the drum which would sound the retirement and the officer which would order it, even itself.
In this manner it obliged everyone, him including, to think that it was better to die as a combatant than while being dishonoured. Its final exclamation was a cheer with Ferdinand VII, the prince who at this time personified the best Spanish hopes.
Battle of Palo Hincado
The battle was going to be decisive, since the governor himself came with largest from the forces of which it laid out and its defeat would mean the triumph of the countryside. The French began the hostilities towards the surroundings of midday. The French cavalry advanced to cut the left wing hispanico-Creole. The riders directed by the captain Antonio Sosa ran to the meeting of those, obliging them to draw on their supports. This first shock body with body was bloody. Sánchez Ramirez gave the order then to advance with the cavalry of its right wing, directed by the captain Vicente Mercedes, operation which was carried out with a great speed, by rolling up the enemy. Ten minutes of fight were enough so that the battle field is covered with French corpses.
The tactics of Sánchez Ramirez consisted, as consigned in its Newspaper, to quickly transform the duel of the remote shootings into engagements with the body with body, in which the Dominican ones were experts. They carried out it with such an imposing presence and audacity that there were only seven died on their side. Among those, significantly, chiefs of the two bodies of cavalry, the captains Antonio Sosa and Vicente Mercedes.
By seeing demolished his battalions, the Ferrand general flees precipitately in direction of Santo Domingo with a group of surviving officers, continued by a squadron ordered by colonel Pedro Santana, father homonymic of the future president of the Republic. The fugitive ones gained ground and crossed a river. The squadron stopped the continuation there, of fear of being vulnerable in discovered ground, at the thank you of embusqués gunners awaiting them. What made it possible fugitive to stop and to rest in the valley of Guaiquía . At this place, Ferrand, unhappy and dominated by the discouragement, committed suicide of a blow of gun in the head.
Sources
- Delafosse, Lemonnier. Second Saint Campaign Domingue (Free-Dominican War of 1808) , 1946.
- Guillermin, Gilbert. Historical Newspaper of the revolution of the Spanish part of Saint Domingue , Imp. statement Lafourcade, Philadelphia, the USA 1810.
- Sánchez Ramírez, Juan. Diario of Reconquista , Editora Montalvo, Santo Domingo (R.D.) 1957.
- Troncoso Sánchez, Pedro. El drama of the idea nacional in Santo Domingo known there relación idiot Puerto Rico , Acad. from Ciencias de República Dominicana, 1977.
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