Battle of Gumbinnen

The battles of Gumbinnen , initiated by the Germans at the dawn of the August 20th 1914, is the first major offensive on the Russian face at the time of the First World War. It succeeds a battle delivered by the eighth German army, carried out by Maximilian von Prittwitz to Stalluponen the August 17th 1914.

Be a prelude to with the battle

Encouraged by the success of impatient ordering First Body, the general Hermann von François with Stalluponen where it captured 3.000 Russian prisoners before sounding the retirement towards Gumbinnen, with 15km in the west of Stalluponen, Prittwitz, under the pressures of known as Francois, decides to carry out an attack against the First Army ordered by the general Paul von Rennenkampf, in Gumbinnen. Conscious that the Second Russian Army, under the command of the general Alexandre Samsonov, advanced towards north starting from the Poland, Prittwitz decides to engage the forces of Rennenkampf, advancing towards the east on a face of 55km, on the first occasion. The day before the battle the Eighth German Army of Prittwitz von Gaffron is strong of 8 1/2 divisions of infantry (102 battalions, 58 squadrons and 95 batteries). It will attack the First Russian Army of Rennenkampf which counts 6 1/2 divisions of infantry (94 battalions, 124 squadrons, 55 batteries), that is to say roughly 130.000 Germans against 60.000 Russians (in an erroneous way the Germans allot to the First Russian Army 24 divisions). In number, the Germans are lower in cavalry, superiors in artillery infantry and very largely higher. Other circumstances influence the First Russian Army unfavourably. The Germans completed their mobilization on August 10th and await the Russians of firm footing. The First Army must finish its mobilization the 36 ième day, but it passes to the offensive the 15th day on the request of France. The consequences of precipitation are multiple. The Russian army is private of its divisions of reserve, even its units of active are not complete. There are no units of transport (the spacing of the railways is different between the Russian and German networks). August 20th, the Russians have behind them six days of forced marches, the Germans were conveyed in the train.

Attack

After having assigned a body to keep the backs of the Eighth Army against the projection of Samsonov, Prittwitz forms three bodies strengthened of an additional division on a line in the south of Gumbinnen, approximately 40 km inside the border of Eastern Prussia. The German offensive however is launched in all haste by the impatient François general around 4 hours of the morning before the two other bodies did not finish their preparations. The Mackensen general, in the center and the general von Below, in the south reached their full state of combat only from four to eight hours after François had launched his offensive with the First body. As regards the additional division dispatched by Prittwitz, it was able too late to have some share with the combat. Although the First Army of Rennenkampf defends its positions with eagerness (combat of Brakuponen in particular) and inflicts with the Prussian regiments very heavy losses, its right side collapses in the middle of the afternoon after having exhausted its ammunition, François then continues them on 8 km. This opening encouraged Mackensen to launch its attack when its body was ready around 8 a.m. Below followed at midday.

German failure

However, the First Russian army, alerted by the hasty attack of Francois, effectively deployed heavy artillery on the face which made a massacre among the troops of Mackensen and Below, forcing them to reprocess in disorder on nearly 24 km. Francois, conscious that the German face collapsed in the center and the south was in the obligation to authorize the retirement in his turn. In the rout, the Russians captured 6.000 Germans.

Reprocess

Panicked by the effectiveness of the Russian counter-attack and fearing that the Second Army of Samsonov does not unite with the First Army of Rennenkampf in order to encircle the Eighth Army, Prittwitz ordered a general retirement on the the Vistula in spite of the apparent lack of will of Rennenkampf to continue the runaways, thus conceding the totality of Eastern Prussia with the Russians.

Consequences

Helmuth von Moltke, chief of staff general in Berlin, furious of the decision of general retirement of the Eighth Army, which opens all Eastern Prussia with the Russian conquest, recalls Prittwitz and its second, von Waldersee in Berlin to dislocate them their functions. Bringing back imperturbable the Paul von Hindenburg of the retirement, Moltke gives him the command of the Eighth Armed and assigns aggressive the Erich Ludendorff, which was distinguished during the capture from Liege, as chief of staff of the Eighth Army. Fortunately for Hindenburg, the retirement on the Vistula was not fully carried out when it arrived the August 23rd to take the command of the face. Ludendorff consultant and colonel Hoffman, chief of the operations as a second, Hindenburg manages to dam up the retirement and selected to gather his forces and of launching an offensive against the Second Russian Army of Samsonov going up by the south. This attack will lead to the greatest German victory of the Great War: the Battle of Tannenberg where the Germans will be able to exploit the starting weaknesses of the Russian armies (logistic unpreparedness, under-manpower, problems, insufficient artillery) and to profit with full with their numerical superiority. On the painful impression of the defeat of Gumbinnen, Moltke makes the error then to take two complete army corps of the face of France where the German masses started to break and précipitemment in Prussia-Eastern transfers them. It is the origin of the stop of the German troops to the Bataille of the Marne.

Sources

" History of the Army russe". General Serge Andolenko. Flammarion editions - 1967.

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